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ABSTRACT
In this study, I investigate how news that a company has engaged in aggressive tax
avoidance affects the company’s reputation. If the general public believes companies have a
responsibility to pay their “fair share” of the national tax burden, then they will likely view
aggressive tax avoidance negatively. If instead the public believes companies have a
responsibility to shareholders to maximize profits by minimizing tax, then they will likely view
aggressive tax avoidance positively. I examine these two possibilities by conducting an
experiment. I find that people tend to view aggressive tax avoidance negatively and thus
companies suffer reputational damage when the public learns that they engaged in these tax
avoidance strategies. Within this experiment, I also investigate whether the degree of
reputational damage depends on the company’s prior reputation and/or the specific tax strategy
utilized. I find that neither prior reputation nor tax strategy’s legality consistently affect the
amount of reputational damage. I conduct a second experiment that investigates whether tax
professionals accurately anticipate these consequences. I find that tax professionals generally
understand that such strategies result in reputational damage, but that they somewhat
underestimate the degree of reputational damage experienced by tax-avoiding companies. My
results have important implications for companies and their tax advisors as they weigh the
benefits, costs, and risks associated with various tax strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many well-known companies (e.g., Apple, General Electric, Google,
Starbucks, Amazon, Nike) have been publicly accused of engaging in overly aggressive tax
avoidance strategies (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, & Omer, 2015; Gallemore, Maydew, &
Thornock, 2014). These strategies have reportedly created billions of dollars of corporate tax
savings, resulting in the same amount of lost governmental tax revenue.1 Organizations such as
Americans for Tax Fairness and Tax Justice Network have increased the public’s awareness of
the negative effects of tax avoidance, shaming corporations who use aggressive tax strategies.
The U.S. government has also provided an opinion, referring to aggressive tax strategies as
“frivolous tax schemes” that “threaten the U.S. tax system’s integrity if honest taxpayers believe
that others do not pay their fair share of tax” (GAO, 2011). Echoing this concern, the former
Internal Revenue Service Commissioner, Doug Shulman, was quoted as saying, “the general
public has little tolerance for overly aggressive tax planning that can be viewed as corporations
playing tax games” (Shulman, 2009).
However, it is unclear whether Shulman’s claim is accurate. If the public believes
companies harm society by shirking their tax obligations and not paying their perceived fair
share of the tax burden, then engaging in such strategies will harm corporate reputation. On the
other hand, if the public believes that companies have an obligation to their shareholders to
maximize profits by minimizing taxes paid, then tax avoidance may not result in reputational
damage. The extant academic literature on this issue is mixed, providing support for both ideas.
Surveys of corporate tax executives suggest that they overwhelmingly believe that discovery of

1

A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study reported two-thirds of U.S. corporations did not
pay federal income tax between 2006 and 2013. Additionally, the GAO reported that 42.5% of large corporations
paid no federal income taxes in 2012, and nearly 20% of these large corporations reported profitable financial
statements (GAO, 2016).
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aggressive tax strategies will negatively affect a company’s reputation, resulting in loss of
customers, investors, and quality employees (Austin & Wilson, 2017; Dyreng, Hoopes, & Wilde,
2016; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, & Shroff, 2014). However, prior archival studies do not
consistently find companies experience reputational losses when aggressive tax strategies are
discovered and reported publicly (Gallemore et al., 2014; Hanlon & Slemord, 2009; Kubick et
al., 2009; Wilson, 2009).
I conduct an experiment that provides more definitive empirical evidence on how the
public reacts when they learn that a company has engaged in an aggressive tax avoidance
strategy. Specifically, in my first experiment, I ask 294 members of the general public to
evaluate a company’s reputation before and after learning the company used a tax strategy to
avoid $2 billion in taxes. The experiment has a 2 X 3 design, where I vary the tax-avoiding
company’s prior reputation at two levels (Positive, Negative) and specific features of the tax
avoidance strategy at three levels (Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent, Legal/Inconsistent with
Law’s Intent, Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent).
I hypothesize that companies will experience reputational damage after news of
aggressive tax avoidance. I find strong support for this general hypothesis: aggressive tax
avoidance appears to harm corporate reputation when the public learns of the avoidance. I also
hypothesize that companies with a negative prior reputation will suffer greater reputational losses
from aggressive tax avoidance than companies with a positive prior reputation. However, my
results show, if anything, an opposite effect: companies with a positive prior reputation appear to
suffer greater losses than those with a negative prior reputation. I also predict that tax avoidance
will be viewed less negatively if it is legal (versus illegal) and if it is consistent with the tax law’s
intent (versus inconsistent with the tax law’s intent). Surprisingly, I find that the public does not
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punish companies significantly more for engaging in illegal tax avoidance strategies, but it does
punish companies for engaging in legal strategies that do not follow the law’s intent. Finally, I
correctly predict that any reputational losses suffered as a result of tax avoidance strategies will
lead to changes in the public’s intended behaviors toward the company. Specifically, I predict
and find that when reputation suffers, people indicate that they are less willing to invest in the
company’s stock, less willing to seek employment with the company, and less willing to use
and/or purchase the company’s products.
My second experiment examines a separate, but related, question: do experienced tax
professionals accurately predict the reputation consequences that companies experience when the
public becomes aware of aggressive tax avoidance? I hypothesize that tax professionals’
education and experience provides a level of expertise that allows them to accurately anticipate
the public’s reactions to news of aggressive tax avoidance. In Experiment 2, I ask 33 managerand partner-level tax professionals to view the same news articles provided to participants in
Experiment 1. The tax professionals then predict how the public will rate the tax-avoiding
company’s reputation. I compare tax professionals’ predictions about corporate reputation with
the actual reputation responses from Experiment 1. My results suggest that tax professionals
anticipate reputational damage, yet somewhat underestimate the extent of the damage companies
experience after news of aggressive tax avoidance. However, my small Experiment 2 sample size
indicates that these findings should be treated as exploratory.
My study’s results contribute to both practice and theory. From a practical perspective,
these results demonstrate that if the public becomes aware of aggressive tax avoidance strategies,
then the tax-avoiding companies will experience reputational losses. Further, these reputational
losses appear to make the public less willing to associate with the company, in terms of their
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investment, purchase, and employment decisions. These findings are informative to companies
as they weigh the obvious and immediate monetary benefits of aggressive tax avoidance against
potential future reputation costs. My study’s results also contribute to the academic literature by
helping to reconcile conflicting results of prior studies that have investigated the reputational
consequences of aggressive tax avoidance. There are two possible explanations for this conflict.
One explanation is that negative reputation consequences have not been detected in prior studies
because of limitations in this type of archival research. Alternatively, negative reputation
consequences exist, but they have not been observed empirically because firms and their advisors
correctly anticipate damaging situations and only engage in tax avoidance when it is not
expected to harm reputation. With my first experiment, I directly measure the public’s
perception of a company’s reputation before and after news of tax avoidance to determine if the
news does damage a firm’s reputation. My second experiment allows me to determine if tax
professionals’ predictions about the reputational consequences of tax avoidance strategies are
accurate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides theoretical development
for my predictions. Sections III and IV describe the method and results for Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2, respectively, and Section V concludes.
II. THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A company’s financial motivation to engage in an aggressive tax avoidance strategy is
undeniable: tax avoidance strategies ultimately result in lower taxes and higher reported profits.
However, aggressive tax strategies can also result in negative effects to corporate reputation
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(Harpaz, 2013; Kocieniewski, 2011).2 That is, if the public believes that companies who avoid
taxes are shirking their responsibility to society by not paying its fair share of the nation’s tax
burden, they may view the company and its products and services negatively.3 Thus, when
companies make decisions about whether to engage in tax avoidance strategies, they must weigh
the potential tax savings against the responsibility to all corporate stakeholders and the potential
for reputational damage (Freeman, 1999).
Interestingly, prior research on the reputation consequences of tax avoidance is mixed.
Some empirical studies observe negative reputation effects after press coverage of tax avoidance,
and other studies show no reputational consequences from tax avoidance. Specifically, Hanlon
and Slemrod (2009) find that after the public receives news of aggressive tax avoidance, there is
an immediate stock price decline. They argue that this decline is due to the market punishing the
company reputationally for aggressive tax avoidance. Gallemore et al. (2014) replicate Hanlon’s
findings, demonstrating the same immediate negative market reaction to public disclosure of tax
avoidance. However, Gallemore et al. (2014) also examine additional reputation consequences
using a number of additional proxies for corporate reputation. Specifically, they measure the
company’s reputation with employees (CEO, CFO, and auditor turnover), the company’s
reputation with customers (sales, sales growth and advertising expense), the company’s
reputation with the business media (rank on Fortune’s “Most Admired Companies” list), and the
company’s reputation with tax authorities (effective tax rate). Gallemore et al. (2014) do not
observe negative reputational consequences from tax avoidance for any of these additional

2

Consistent with Gallemore et al. (2014), I define reputation as a general perception that all interested stakeholders
have of the company based on past events.
3
Note that there is also the potential for negative reputation consequences from not engaging in aggressive tax
avoidance, if the public believes that the company is shirking its responsibility to corporate shareholders to
maximize profits (Friedman, 2007).
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corporation reputation measures. Thus, prior archival studies do not provide a clear
understanding of whether companies actually suffer reputational damage from tax avoidance.
These archival studies suffer from a number of limitations that may explain their mixed
findings. First, the sample of discovered avoidance cases is small, because tax payment
disclosure is not required and U.S. tax returns are not publicly available (Gallemore et al., 2014;
Graham et al., 2014). Second, corporate reputation reflects stakeholders’ perceptions of the
company. Archival researchers are not able to directly elicit perceptions from stakeholders,
instead, they must rely on rough proxies for these perceptions. My study uses an experimental
method, allowing me to directly measure beliefs about the company (i.e., reputation) before and
after the public is made aware of the company’s aggressive tax avoidance strategies.
Despite these mixed findings, I expect companies to incur reputational damage when the
public becomes aware they engaged in tax avoidance strategies. I base this prediction on prior
literature that examines how corporate tax executives think about the reputational consequences
of tax strategies. Graham et al. (2014) surveyed 595 tax executives and found that 70% of them
considered reputation consequences as an “important” or “very important” factor in their tax
strategy decisions. Similarly, Ernst & Young surveyed 830 corporate tax and finance executives
and 89% of respondents indicated they were “somewhat” or “significantly” concerned about
media coverage regarding taxes. This was a 72% overall increase since 2011, suggesting that
reputation concerns are becoming an increasingly important factor in tax strategy decisions,
perhaps due to the increase in advocacy groups and prevalence of media coverage (EY, 2014).4
Further, companies with high levels of perceived corporate social responsibility (Lanis &
Richardson, 2012) and companies with valuable brands (Austin & Wilson, 2016) are less likely

4

Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) also report that some executives evaluate how news of aggressive avoidance would look
in newspaper headlines as a considering factor of their strategy decisions.
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to engage in aggressive tax strategies, presumably because tax executives at these companies are
especially motivated to avoid negative reputation consequences. In a similar vein, Dyreng et al.
(2016) find that companies are less likely to employ aggressive tax strategies as public scrutiny
of tax avoidance increases. Taken together, these studies provide strong support for the idea that
tax executives believe aggressive tax strategies negatively affect corporate reputation, despite the
lack of direct empirical evidence of actual reputational damage from tax avoidance.
I predict that tax executives, who regularly make decisions about tax strategies and view
the subsequent consequences associated with these avoidance strategies, are correct to worry that
companies will incur reputational damage if the strategies become public knowledge. In my
experiment, I directly measure a company’s reputation with the general public. I expect to
observe negative reputation effects when the public learns that a company has engaged in
aggressive tax avoidance. I formalize this reasoning in the following alternative-form
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Companies will incur reputational damage if the general public learns that
they have engaged in tax avoidance strategies.
In my first hypothesis, I predict that companies will generally suffer reputational damage
after news of aggressive tax avoidance. My next three hypotheses extend Hypothesis 1 by
predicting how features of a tax-avoiding company (Hypothesis 2) and features of a tax strategy
(Hypotheses 3 and 4) might influence the amount of reputational damage a company will incur
after news of tax avoidance.
Research in the field of psychology suggests that a company’s prior reputation will
influence how the public reacts to its subsequent actions. Specifically, prior psychology studies
find that people are generally more critical of evidence that contradicts their prior beliefs than
they are of evidence that confirms their prior beliefs (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Lord, Ross, &
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Lepper, 1979). Applying these findings to my study, I expect that when the public views a
company positively, then they will be more skeptical of, and thus less influenced by, news that
the company aggressively avoided taxes.5 Conversely, when the public views a company
negatively, they will more readily accept the notion that the company engaged in a “bad”
behavior like aggressive tax avoidance. As a result, companies that engage in tax avoidance will
experience greater reputational damage if they have a negative prior negative reputation than if
they have a positive prior reputation. I formalize this reasoning in the following alternative-form
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Companies with negative prior reputations will incur greater reputational
damage than companies with positive prior reputations if the general public learns that
they have engaged in tax avoidance strategies.
Tax strategies vary in aggressiveness. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide an
aggressiveness continuum for evaluating a tax strategy’s aggressiveness. This continuum is
useful when thinking about how various strategy features might influence reputational damage if
the public learns about the tax avoidance. On one end of the continuum houses nonaggressive
strategies that are undoubtedly legal and follow the law’s intent, such as tax-exempt municipal
bond interest. On the other end of the continuum are highly aggressive strategies, often
considered “abusive,” which are adopted for the sole purpose of avoiding tax obligations. An
example of a highly aggressive strategy is corporate-owned life insurance taken out on
employees who do not possess management duties, where the company collects death benefits
upon the employee’s death (Gallemore et al., 2014).

They might even view the tax avoidance in a positive light (i.e., as the corporation’s responsibility to maximize
shareholder wealth) (Friedman, 2007).
5
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As aggressiveness increases, tax strategies run the risk of becoming inadvertently illegal,
which is typically discovered by tax authorities post hoc through an IRS audit.6 If a company is
considering an aggressive tax avoidance strategy, it should be knowledgeable of all potential
risks associated with the strategy. Most obvious is the risk that the evasion will be detected and
severely penalized by the tax authorities. Less obvious is the potential reputational risk that a
company will face if caught evading tax in an illegal manner.
The extant tax literature does not provide much, if any, empirical evidence on how a tax
strategy’s legality influences subsequent reputational damage. The likely reason for this gap in
the literature is that prior studies in this area generally use archival data. Archival methods make
it difficult to measure reputation and to isolate the reputation consequences of specific tax
strategy features because of the large number of dimensions on which tax strategies vary. My
experimental method allows me to directly measure reputation and to hold constant features
other than the tax strategy’s legality.
Research in non-tax domains finds that people use existing rules and laws to help them
judge the morality of behavior (Kirchler, Maciejovsky, & Schneider, 2003; Tyler, 2006) and
view people and companies that engage in illegal activities negatively (Baucus & Baucus, 1997;
Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010; Williams & Barrett, 2000). For
example, prior research compares perceptions of marijuana use in states where it is legal and
illegal, finding that people view marijuana use more negatively when it is illegal (Carliner,
Brown, Sarvet, & Hasin, 2017). I expect people to use legality as a cue for “good” or “bad”
behavior in the tax domain as well. In other words, I predict that if a company’s tax avoidance
strategy is illegal, the company will incur greater reputational damage than if the same strategy

Slemrod (2004) defines corporate tax noncompliance: “corporation income tax that legally is owed but is not
reported or paid.”
6
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were legal, because the public will view an illegal tax strategy more negatively. I formalize this
reasoning with the following alternative-form hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Companies will incur greater reputational damage if the general public
learns that the company engaged in illegal tax avoidance strategies than if the public
learns that the company engaged in legal tax avoidance.
Hanlon and Heitzman’s (2010) tax aggressiveness continuum is also useful when
thinking about how a strategy’s consistency with the tax law’s intent might influence the public’s
reaction. This continuum suggests that even a legal avoidance strategy may be perceived as
aggressive if it violates the intent or ‘spirit’ of the law. For example, Payne and Raiborn (2018)
argue that aggressive tax behavior, which intentionally ignores the law’s intent and reduces
payment of a company’s fair share of the national tax burden is not appropriate. Thus, it is
possible that the public will view legal strategies that are inconsistent with the law’s intent
positively because they believe the company’s primary responsibility is to minimize tax and
maximize shareholder value (Friedman, 2007). Though I think it is more likely that the public
will perceive strategies that are inconsistent with the law’s intent as evidence that managers are
willfully shirking their responsibility to society and not paying their fair share of tax (Freeman,
1999).7 In support of this idea Antonetti and Maklan (2016) conducted a study, outside the tax
domain, of public outrage to news of two different corporate behaviors. One of the behaviors
investigated was tax avoidance. Results demonstrate that participants consider tax strategies that
are legal but inconsistent with the intent of the law to be overly aggressive and irresponsible.8 I

7

According to Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl (2007), the measurement of fair share is subjective and dependent, in large
part, on one’s perception of justice. A majority of U.S. residents are obligated to pay tax. Due to this similarity
between corporations and individuals, if the media reports a large, beneficial corporate tax strategy, then the
corporation runs the risk that the public will compare the reported tax savings to their own, personal tax obligations.
It is possible this comparison will have an adverse effect on corporate reputation because the public perceives this as
unfair.
8
The second behavior measured in the study was an act of non-financial fraud committed by a pharmaceutical
company. This fraud was considered by the public to be a more serious violation of corporate moral conduct.
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rely on these findings to predict that companies will experience greater negative reputational
consequences if their legal tax strategies are inconsistent with the tax law’s intent:
Hypothesis 4: Companies will incur greater reputational damage when the general
public learns that the company engaged in legal tax avoidance strategies if the strategy
does not follow the intent of the law.
In addition to examining the effect of tax avoidance on corporate reputation, I also
examine whether these reputation consequences, in turn, affect how stakeholders interact with
the company. In other domains, reputation influences the public’s willingness to invest in the
company’s stock, their willingness to use and/or purchase the company’s products, and the
strength of their desire to be employed by the company (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley,
1990; Gallemore et al., 2014; Hall, 1993; Ponzi, Fombrun, & Gardberg, 2011; Roberts &
Dowling, 2002). My experiment does not allow me to collect data on actual investment,
purchase, or employment behaviors. Thus, I measure the public’s intended behaviors toward the
tax-avoiding company.
There are two competing effects that might influence how tax avoidance impacts the
public’s willingness to invest in the company’s stock. On one hand, tax avoidance results in
lower taxes paid and thus higher profits, which should make the company a more appealing
investment. Profitability, however, is not the only indicator of future investment behavior.
Shareholders also value non-financial performance, or reputation, when making their investment
decisions (Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015). Indeed, reputation-damaging events, such as news of
aggressive tax avoidance, may make the public less likely to want future involvement with the
tax-avoiding company (Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Although aggressive tax avoidance generates

Interestingly, the authors choose corporate tax avoidance because tax strategies can be considered legal, yet violate
the law’s intention (Antonetti & Maklan, 2016).
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higher profits, I predict the negative reputational effects incurred after news of an aggressive tax
avoidance strategy will deter future investment in the company. I formalize this reasoning in the
following alternative-form hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5a: When companies incur reputational damage related to tax avoidance
strategies, these reputation effects will make the public less willing to invest in the
company’s stock.
Turning next to the effects of aggressive tax avoidance on employment decisions, I
predict that reputational damage caused by tax avoidance will make people less interested in
being employed by the tax-avoiding company. I base this prediction on prior literature that
suggests that corporate reputation plays a crucial role in people’s willingness to work at a
company. Specifically, employees, both potential and current, place value in a company’s
positive reputation when making employment decisions (Chauvin, & Guthrie, 1994; Stigler,
1962) and positive reputation helps attract and retain employees (Roberts & Dowling, 2002).
This leads to the following alternative-form hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5b: When companies incur reputational damage related to tax avoidance
strategies, these reputation effects will make the public less interested in employment
with the company.
Similarly, I expect the negative reputation consequences stemming from tax avoidance
strategies to reduce people’s willingness to use or purchase the company’s products. Prior
studies find that corporate reputation influences customers’ willingness to buy the company’s
products, their product loyalty, and their level of satisfaction with the company’s products
(Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990; Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015; Rao, Agarwall, & Dahloff, 2004;
Shapiro, 1983). Within the tax domain, prior research suggests that consumer product firms with
strong brand recognition engage in less aggressive tax strategies, likely in an effort to protect
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their valuable reputations (Austin & Wilson, 2017; Kubick et al., 2015). This leads to the
following alternative-form hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5c: When companies incur reputational damage related to tax avoidance
strategies, these reputation effects will make the public less willing to use and/or
purchase the company’s products.
When companies make decisions about the aggressiveness of their tax strategies, they
often rely on the expertise of tax professionals to provide guidance on the costs and benefits of
different strategies (Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009; Engel, Erickson, & Maydew, 1999; Gallemore et
al., 2014; Wilson, 2009). In order to give good advice to their clients, tax professionals must
have an accurate understanding of all potential risks associated with tax avoidance strategies,
including reputation risks. Thus, in addition to examining the reputation consequences of tax
avoidance, my study also examines whether tax professionals accurately anticipate these
consequences.
Certified tax professionals (CPAs and EAs) have extensive education and experience
requirements (Hunter, 1983; Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Goff, 1988). By the time tax
professionals advance to levels within their firms where they are providing clients with advice on
tax strategies, they generally have many years of experience and feedback from observing the
risks as well as the actual benefits and costs of different tax strategies. This knowledge and
experience should provide tax professionals with requisite expertise to accurately predict
potential reputation consequences their clients could experience if the public became aware of
the client’s tax avoidance strategies. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Public tax professional will accurately predict changes in the public’s
perception of corporate reputation after news of aggressive tax avoidance.
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III. EXPERIMENT 1
My first hypothesis predicts that companies who engage in tax avoidance will suffer
negative reputational consequences. I further predict that (a) a company’s prior reputation and
features of the tax avoidance strategy will affect the amount of reputational damage (Hypotheses
2 through 4), and (b) these reputation changes will influence the public’s willingness to purchase
the company’s products and to invest in or work for the company (Hypothesis 5). To test these
hypotheses, I conduct an experiment in which members of the U.S. general public evaluate a
company’s reputation both before and after reading a news article about a company being
investigated for a transfer pricing tax strategy that avoided $2 billion in U.S. taxes by moving
profits offshore.9 I vary whether the company that avoided taxes had a positive prior reputation
(Google) or a negative prior reputation (Exxon Mobil) and whether the tax avoidance strategy
was consistent with letter of the law and/or the intent of the tax law. Additional methodological
details about the experimental participants and design are provided below. To view the full set
of Experiment 1 materials, see Appendix B.
Experiment 1 Participants
Experiment 1 participants were 294 English-speaking U.S. residents at least 18 years of
age.10 I recruited participants using Cint, a company that specializes in finding online workers
9

The strategy reported is loosely based on the Double Dutch with an Irish Sandwich planning strategy, which is an
actual tax avoidance strategy utilized by many U.S. companies (Duhigg & Kocieniewski, 2012). This strategy uses
international tax law and transfer pricing to significantly reduce tax obligations by transferring income earned in the
United States to Ireland through a series of complex financial statement transactions. To avoid tax, income is finally
transferred to a country with little or no corporate tax obligations. This strategy was chosen because of the
ambiguity in the perception of the legality and intent of the transaction. It is complex and the economic substance of
this transaction is questionable. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, pg. 28) suggest strategies similar to this “push the
envelope” of tax law.
10
The initial sample included 633 participants, 41 responses were immediately eliminated because they had the
same response for every question and missed both manipulation check questions. The full sample size was 592,
49.7% of this sample was eliminated in my primary analyses because participants failed at least one of the two
manipulation check questions. Prior literature on the use of online workers in accounting research suggests that
some online workers are “speeders” who complete experimental tasks extremely quickly and pay insufficient
attention to task details (Smith, Roster, Golden, & Albaum, 2016). I provide supplemental analyses at the end of
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for surveys and experiments.11 Participants took an average of 8.5 minutes to complete the
experiment and received compensation between $0.75 and $1.25 from Cint. Participants were
75% female, with ages ranging from 18 to 67, a mean age of 45, and 53% were married.
Participants self-assessed their political beliefs as follows: Extremely liberal (6%), Liberal
(15%), Somewhat liberal (14%), Neither liberal nor conservative (33%), Somewhat conservative
(12%), Conservative (12%), and Extremely conservative (8%). Participants also indicated the
highest level of education they had completed: High School (34%), 2-year college (18%), 4-year
college (30%), master’s or other professional degree (13%), and other (5%).
Experiment 1 Design
The first experiment used a 2 x 3 between-subjects design that manipulated the
company’s Prior Reputation at two levels (Positive Prior Reputation, Negative Prior
Reputation) and the company’s Tax Strategy at three levels (Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent,
Legal/ Inconsistent with Law’s Intent, Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent).12
Independent Variables. To manipulate Prior Reputation, I varied the company that
engaged in the tax avoidance strategy. To identify companies with positive prior reputation and
negative prior reputation, I conducted a separate pre-test. I first identified ten well-known U.S.

Section III to discuss how the hypothesis test results differ when I include all participants’ responses. I feel it is
reasonable to predict the same consequences with the full sample. It is likely participants that did not successfully
complete both questions correctly did, at a minimum, quickly read the newspaper headline and gave some
consideration to the tax avoidance news (Dor, 2003).
11
www.cint.com, Cint is a platform based online insight exchange with more 1,800 panels and access to over 40
million panelists. Based on qualifying characteristics of the project, email requests for participation are sent directly
to panelists that meet qualifying criteria.
12
I do not include an Illegal/Consistent with Law’s Intent condition because in practice, there are few, if any, tax
strategies that would fall into this category.
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companies from The Harris Poll-2017 Reputation Quotient® Rankings.13, 14 Five “positive
reputation” companies were chosen from among the top twenty companies listed in the 2017
rankings: Amazon.com, Apple, Google, Johnson & Johnson, and Walt Disney. Four “negative
reputation” companies were selected from the bottom twenty companies listed in the 2017
rankings: Comcast, Exxon Mobil, United Airlines, and Wells Fargo.15 After identifying these
ten companies, I asked 50 Mechanical Turk workers to rate each company’s reputation for
corporate citizenship on a 9-point Likert scale, endpoints labeled Strongly Agree (1) and Strongly
Disagree (9). Google received the most positive mean reputation rating (4.1) and Exxon Mobil
received the least positive mean reputation rating (7.0).16 Based on this pre-test survey, I use
Google [Exxon Mobil] as the company for my Positive Prior Reputation [Negative Prior
Reputation] condition.
To manipulate Tax Strategy (Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent, Legal/ Inconsistent with
Law’s Intent, and Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent), I varied the wording of a tax expert’s
opinion on the legality and intent of the tax avoidance strategy within the news article.
In the Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent condition, the news article includes the following
paragraph (emphasis added):
13

https://theharrispoll.com/reputation-quotient/. Company (ranking) in alphabetical order: Amazon.com (1), Apple
Inc. (5), Comcast Corporation (90), Exxon Mobil Corporation (87), Google Inc.(8), Johnson & Johnson (4), Phillip
Morris USA (an Altria Company) (not rated), The Walt Disney Company (7), United Airlines (82), and Wells Fargo
& Company (99).
14
Manipulating Prior Reputation using real companies makes the study more externally valid and allows for a strong
manipulation by ensuring that participants have well-developed prior beliefs about the firms. However,
manipulating Prior Reputation this way sacrifices some experimental control because the two firms differ on other
dimensions as well. That is, it is possible that the Google and Exxon Mobil differ on another dimension that
influences how the public reacts to information about the company’s tax strategies.
15
Note that I did not simply use the top-5 and bottom-5 companies on the ranking list because I wanted to focus on
companies that I believed had broad name recognition. A Phillip Morris USA (an Altria Company) was selected as
a company, although not in the rankings, because negative feelings toward the tobacco company are common.
16
Results of a second related question also suggest that Google [Exxon Mobil] is the company with the most [least]
positive reputation. Specifically, participants were asked to list the one company they found to be the BEST
corporate citizen and the one company they found to be the WORST corporate citizen, which is known to be another
measure of reputation (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000). Google was the company participants most often
selected as the BEST corporate citizen (21%) and Exxon Mobil was the company most often selected as WORST
citizen (38%). Full text of the pre-test survey is available in Appendix A.
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When asked about XX’s tax avoidance strategies, Seton Hall University tax
professor, Dr. Ted Lorse stated that, “Tax law is incredibly complex, making it
difficult to interpret and apply. My opinion is that XX’s strategies are technically
legal, in that they do satisfy the letter of 2015 U.S. tax laws.” Lorse continued,
“These strategies do appear to be consistent with the ‘spirit,’ or intent, of 2015
tax laws. This suggests that corporations utilizing these complex transactions are
not shirking on their ‘fair share’ of our country’s tax burden.”
In the Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent condition, the news article instead includes the
following paragraph (emphasis added):
When asked about XX’s tax avoidance strategies, Seton Hall University tax
professor, Dr. Ted Lorse stated that, “Tax law is incredibly complex, making it
difficult to interpret and apply. My opinion is that XX’s strategies are technically
legal, in that they do satisfy the letter of 2015 U.S. tax laws.” Lorse continued,
“However, these strategies do not appear to be consistent with the ‘spirit,’ or
intent, of 2015 tax laws. This suggests that corporations utilizing these complex
transactions are shirking on their ‘fair share’ of our country’s tax burden.”
Finally, in the Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent condition, the news article includes the
following paragraph (emphasis added):
When asked about XX’s tax avoidance strategies, Seton Hall University tax professor,
Dr. Ted Lorse stated that, “Tax law is incredibly complex, making it difficult to interpret
and apply. My opinion is that XX’s strategies are technically illegal, in that they do not
satisfy the letter of 2015 U.S. tax laws.” Lorse continued, “These strategies also do not
appear to be consistent with the ‘spirit,’ or intent, of 2015 tax laws. This suggests that
corporations utilizing these complex transactions are shirking on their ‘fair share’ of
our country’s tax burden.”
Dependent Variables. Two sets of dependent measures captured the public’s beliefs
about the company’s reputation. The first set of variables is drawn from validated corporate
reputation scales (Ponzi et al., 2011; Walker, 2010) and directly measure reputation. Both before
(pre-test) and after (post-test) reading the news article, participants in the Positive [Negative]
Reputation conditions evaluated the following statements: (1) Google [Exxon Mobil] is a
company I trust, (2) Google [Exxon Mobil] is a company that I admire and respect, (3) I have
good feelings about Google [Exxon Mobil], and (4) Google [Exxon Mobil] has a positive
reputation. Participants also assessed whether (5) Google [Exxon Mobil] is a good corporate
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citizen. Participants indicated their level of agreement with each statement on a Likert scale with
endpoints labeled Strongly Disagree (1) and Strongly Agree (7). The Cronbach’s alpha for the
five pre-test items and the five post-test items are both above the 0.70 threshold, suggesting that
each measure captures one pre-test construct and one post-test construct (Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994). I therefore average participants’ responses to the questions and refer to these summary
measures separately as pre-test and post-test Perceived Reputation.
The second set of variables capture participants’ future behavior intentions that may be
impacted by changes in perceived reputation. Specifically, participants evaluate the following
statements: (1) I am willing to use Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] products, (2) I am willing to invest
in Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] stock, and (3) I would like to be employed by Google [Exxon
Mobil]. Participants indicated their level of agreement with each statement on a Likert scale
with endpoints labeled Strongly Disagree (1) and Strongly Agree (7). After answering the posttest perceived reputation and behavioral intention questions, participants answered a series of
demographic and check questions.
Experiment 1 Results
Manipulation Checks. To check the Prior Reputation manipulation, I analyzed
participants’ pre-test Perceived Reputation responses. Table 1 shows that Google’s pre-test
Perceived Reputation (µ = 5.6) is significantly greater than Exxon Mobil’s pretest Perceived
Reputation (µ = 4.3) (F1,292 = 66.20, p < 0.01). Further, Table 2 shows that, before viewing the
experimental manipulations, participants are more likely to want to invest in Google (F1,292 =
24.20, p < 0.01), to be employed by Google (F1,292 = 29.51, p < 0.01), and to use Google’s
products (F1,292 = 41.75, p < 0.01). Taken together, these results indicate a successful
manipulation of Prior Reputation.
INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE
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To check the Tax Strategy manipulation, I asked participants to answer two check
questions after providing post-test reputation assessments. Specifically, participants indicated
(1) whether the tax expert stated that Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] tax strategy was “technically
consistent with U.S. tax laws (i.e., legal)” or “technically inconsistent with U.S. tax laws (i.e.,
illegal)” and (2) whether the expert stated that Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] tax strategy was
“consistent” or “inconsistent” with the tax law’s intent. I find that 30% [38%] of participants
failed the first [second] Tax Strategy manipulation check. Consistent with other accounting
studies that use online workers, my primary analyses focus only on the 294 participants who
passed both manipulation check questions (Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, & Stinson, 2017).
Supplemental analyses that include all 592 participant responses are provided at the end of this
section.
Tests of Hypotheses 1 through 4. Recall that Hypothesis 1 predicts that companies who
engage in tax avoidance strategies will be perceived as less reputable. Hypotheses 2 through 4
extend this first hypothesis, predicting specific company and strategy factors affect the size of
these negative reputation effects. Specifically, these hypotheses predict that the negative
reputation consequences from tax avoidance will be larger when the company has a less
favorable prior reputation (Hypothesis 2) and when the tax strategy is illegal (Hypothesis 3)
and/or inconsistent with the intent of the tax law (Hypothesis 4).
Underlying my Hypothesis 1 prediction is the assumption that the public believes that
companies have an obligation to pay taxes. To test this assumption, I asked participants to
indicate their beliefs about corporations’ primary responsibility related to taxes. Specifically,
participants were asked, “When Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] management is faced with a decision
about its tax strategies, two competing responsibilities must be considered – their responsibility
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to minimize taxes and maximize profits and their responsibility to be a good corporate citizen by
paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes. Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] primary responsibility should be:”
Participants had to choose between two responses labeled, “Good corporate citizenship (paying
their ‘fair share’)” and “Minimize tax (maximize profits).” Seventy-four percent of participants
believed that the company’s primary responsibility was to pay their fair share of U.S. taxes.
Given the relative importance that people place on corporations paying taxes, I expect them to
react negatively when companies employ large tax avoidance strategies.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that corporations will experience negative reputation consequences
if the public discovers the company has engaged in tax avoidance strategies. To capture negative
reputational consequences, I first calculate a Perceived Reputation difference score for each
participant by subtracting their post-test Perceived Reputation measure from their pre-test
Perceived Reputation measure. I then examine whether these difference scores significantly
differ from zero. When I collapse across all conditions, I find that the mean difference score is
-1.3, which is significantly less than zero (t = -14.06, p < .01). Panel A of Table 3 shows that the
mean difference scores in the six conditions range from a low of -0.9 to a high of -2.0. All mean
difference scores are significantly less than zero (all p < 0.01). Thus, the results provide strong
support for Hypothesis 1: the U.S. general public perceives a company as less reputable when the
company employs aggressive tax avoidance strategies.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicts that companies with negative prior reputations will
incur more reputation damage when the public learns that they engaged in tax avoidance. To test
Hypothesis 2, I compare mean Perceived Reputation difference scores across the Positive and
Negative Prior Reputation conditions. Table 3 shows that the Positive Prior Reputation

SMART OR SHIRKING

25

company incurred greater reputation damage (μ = -1.4) than the Negative Prior Reputation
company (μ = -1.1) (F1, 288 = 3.48, p = 0.06). In other words, when Google and Exxon Mobil
employ the same tax avoidance strategy, Google incurs more reputational damage. This observed
pattern is the opposite of that predicted in Hypothesis 2. One possible explanation for this result
is that the public reacts more when a corporation’s behavior deviates from the public’s
expectations of the corporation. For example, Google was generally viewed as being a “good”
company prior to the tax avoidance news, so the public may be more surprised (and thus react
more negatively) when Google engages in a “bad” behavior.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the public will react more negatively when companies engage
in illegal tax avoidance strategies. The ANOVA results reported in Table 3 suggest that features
of the company’s Tax Strategy affect the reputational consequences of tax avoidance (F2, 288 =
4.25, p < 0.05). To isolate the effects of the strategy’s legality, I compare mean difference scores
in the Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent and Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent condition,
because these two conditions are identical other than the legality of the tax avoidance strategy.
This comparison shows that the reputational damage is greater when the avoidance strategy is
illegal (μ = -1.6) than when it is legal (μ = -1.4), although this difference is not statistically
significant (t = 0.86, p = 0.39). Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the public will react more negatively when companies engage
in tax avoidance strategies that are inconsistent with the tax law’s intent. To test Hypothesis 4, I
compare mean difference scores in the Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent and
Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent conditions, because these two conditions are identical other
than the intent of the tax avoidance strategy. This comparison shows that companies experience
more reputational damage when they employ an avoidance strategy that is legal but inconsistent
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with tax law’s intent (μ = -1.4) than one that is legal and consistent with the law’s intent (μ = 1.0) (t = 2.09, p < 0.05), in support of Hypothesis 4.
Test of Hypotheses 5. Hypothesis 5 predicts that any negative reputation effects
stemming from tax avoidance strategies will, in turn, influence the public’s investment-related,
employment-related, and purchase-related intentions toward the tax-avoiding company. I first
examine changes in participants’ willingness to invest in the company’s stock after learning
about the company’s tax avoidance. Untabulated regression results show that changes in
Perceived Reputation are a significant predictor of changes in participants’ willingness to invest
(t = 15.86, p < 0.01). Further analysis (see Table 4) shows that my Hypothesis 1 findings for
Perceived Reputation are confirmed in the Investment difference scores. That is, the overall
mean Investment difference score of -0.9 is significantly less than zero (t = -8.81, p < 0.01),
suggesting that participants are generally less willing to invest in a tax-avoiding company’s
stock. Indeed, the individual difference scores within each experimental condition, which range
from -0.5 to -1.5, are all significantly less than zero (all p < 0.05).
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Next, I examine participants’ willingness to seek employment with the company after
learning about its tax avoidance. Untabulated regression results show that changes in Perceived
Reputation are a significant predictor of changes in participants’ willingness to seek employment
(t = 16.36, p < 0.01). Further analysis (see Table 5) shows that my Hypothesis 1 findings for
Perceived Reputation are confirmed in the Employment difference scores. That is, the overall
mean Employment difference score of -0.8 is significantly less than zero (t = -8.75, p < 0.01),
suggesting that participants are generally less willing to seek employment with a tax-avoiding
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company. Once again, the individual difference scores within each experimental condition,
which range from -0.5 to -1.5, are all significantly less than zero (all p < 0.05).
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Finally, I examine changes in participants’ willingness to use/purchase the company’s
product after learning about its tax avoidance. Untabulated regression results show that changes
in Perceived Reputation are a significant predictor of changes in participants’ willingness to use
the company’s products (t = 24.09, p < 0.01). Further analysis (see Table 6) shows that my
Hypothesis 1 findings for Perceived Reputation are confirmed in the Product Use difference
scores. That is, the overall mean Product Use difference score of -1.1 is significantly less than
zero (t = -10.63, p < 0.01), suggesting that participants are generally less willing to purchase
products of tax-avoiding companies. Indeed, the individual difference scores within each
experimental condition, which range from -0.7 to -1.6, are all significantly less than zero (all p <
0.01).
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
To summarize, Experiment 1 provides strong support for the idea that companies suffer
negative reputation consequences after the public learns that they engaged in tax avoidance
strategies. Further, these negative reputation effects, in turn, affect the general public’s
willingness to invest in the company’s stock, be employed by the company, and purchase the
company’s products. Results regarding the effect, if any, that the tax strategy’s legality and
consistency with the tax law’s intent has on reputation consequences are mixed. Surprisingly,
the technical legality of the tax strategy does not appear to affect the degree of reputational
damage, but strategies that are inconsistent with the intent of the tax law lead to greater
reputational damage. Finally, though I expected companies with a negative prior reputation to
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incur greater reputational damage, it appears that, if anything, the opposite is true. I find that the
positive prior reputation company will suffer greater reputational loss, perhaps because the
public holds this type of company to a higher citizenship standard.
Experiment 1 Supplemental Analyses
Prior research suggests that some online workers complete experimental tasks quickly
without paying sufficient attention to task (Smith et al., 2016). Thus, my prior analyses excluded
participants who failed one or more of the tax strategy manipulation checks. However, it is
possible that this exclusion criteria excluded not only people who failed to read the materials but
also inadvertently excluded some people who read the news article the way they would normally
read news articles (i.e., not carefully) (Dor, 2003; Smith et al., 2016). Thus, in the remainder of
this section, I also report my full sample analyses using the entire population (n = 592).
Similar to my primary analysis to test Hypothesis 1, I find that when I collapse across all
conditions, the mean Perceived Reputation difference score is -1.1, which is significantly less
than zero (t = -18.12, p < 0.01). Untabulated mean difference scores in the six conditions range
from a low of -0.8 to a high of -1.7. All mean difference scores are significantly less than zero
(all p < 0.01). Thus, this analysis provides additional support for the idea that the public
perceives a company as less reputable when the company has engaged in tax avoidance
strategies.
In my full sample test of Hypothesis 2, I find that the Positive Prior Reputation company
incurred slightly greater reputation damage (µ = -1.2) than the Negative Prior Reputation
company (µ = -1.1), although this difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.86, p = 0.24).
Untabulated full sample ANOVA results suggest that features of the company’s Tax Strategy
affect the reputational consequences of tax avoidance (F2, 586 = 18.85, p < 0.01). Similar to my
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prior Hypothesis 3 tests, reputational damage is greater when the avoidance strategy is illegal (μ
= -1.5) than when it is legal (μ = -1.2), although once again the difference is not statistically
significant (t = 1.48, p = 0.41). My full sample test of Hypothesis 4 shows that companies
experience more reputational damage when they employ an avoidance strategy that is legal but
inconsistent with the tax law’s intent (μ = -0.9) than one that is legal and consistent with the
law’s intent (μ = -1.2), which is again statistically significant (t = 2.65, p < 0.01).
Full sample Hypothesis 5 tests confirm that participants are generally less willing to want
to invest in a tax-avoiding company’s stock, the overall mean difference score of -0.8 is
significantly less than zero (t = -10.81, p < 0.01). Indeed, the individual difference scores within
each experimental condition, which range from -0.5 to -1.3, are all significantly less than zero
(all p < 0.01). Also, full sample tests confirm participants are less willing to obtain employment
at a tax-avoiding company, the overall mean difference score of -0.7 is significantly less than
zero (t = -10.52, p < 0.01). Once again, the individual difference scores within each
experimental condition, which range from -0.5 to -1.2, are all significantly less than zero (all p <
0.01). Finally, full sample tests confirm participants are less willing to want to use and/or
purchase products of company, the overall mean difference score of -1.0 is significantly less than
zero (t = -14.13, p < 0.01). The individual difference scores within each experimental condition,
which range from -0.7 to -1.4, are all significantly less than zero (p < 0.01).
Overall, my supplemental analyses suggest that inferences related to Hypotheses 1
through 5 are identical regardless of whether participants passed or failed the manipulation
checks, all participants are included. In both sets of analyses, Hypotheses 1, 4 and 5 are
supported and Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not supported.
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IV. EXPERIMENT 2
Hypothesis 6 predicts that tax professionals will accurately predict the reputational
consequences of aggressive tax avoidance. To test this hypothesis, I conducted an experiment in
which experienced tax professionals predicted the general public’s reaction to the news article
used in Experiment 1. Similar to the first experiment, I vary whether the company that avoided
taxes had a positive prior reputation (Google) or a negative prior reputation (Exxon Mobil). I
also vary whether the tax avoidance strategy is consistent with the tax law’s intent. Additional
methodological details about the experimental participants and design are provided below. To
view the full set of Experiment 2 materials, see Appendix C.
Experiment 2 Participants
Experiment 2 participants were 33 U.S. tax professionals.17 To be eligible, participants
were required to be either currently or previously licensed as a Certified Public Accountant
(CPA) or an Enrolled Agent (EA), have worked a minimum of five years in public accounting,
and have reached the level of at least manager. Fifty-five percent of Experiment 2 participants
are current tax partners and 27% are current tax managers. The remaining 18% of participants
are tax executives and tax managers who are no longer employed in public accounting. On
average, participants have 24 years of experience working in the tax field.
Experiment 2 Design
Experiment 2 used a 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design that manipulated the
company’s Prior Reputation (Negative Prior Reputation, Positive Prior Reputation) and the
company’s Tax Strategy (Consistent with Law’s Intent, Inconsistent with Law’s Intent).

17

A total of forty-five individuals participated in the experiment, however, twelve responses were eliminated
because the participants did not meet eligibility requirements or did not complete the entire task.
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Independent Variables. Experiment 2 participants viewed the same news article as in
Experiment 1. In other words, similar to Experiment 1, I manipulated Prior Reputation by
varying the company that engaged in the tax avoidance strategy: Google or Exxon Mobil. I
manipulated the company’s Tax Strategy conditions by varying whether a tax expert described
the strategy as Consistent with Law’s Intent or Inconsistent with the Law’s Intent. In both Tax
Strategy conditions, the expert stated that the strategy was legal. Thus, unlike Experiment 1, I
did not include a condition where the tax strategy was illegal. I made this choice because tax
professionals, who have a fiduciary responsibility to abide by relevant tax laws, would likely find
it unrealistic that a client’s strategy would be clearly illegal.
Dependent Variables. Tax professionals were asked to predict how members of the
general public would rate Google’s or Exxon Mobil’s reputation both before and after reading
the news article about the company’s aggressive tax avoidance. Specifically, tax professionals
were instructed to, “Assume that a sample of 100 people from the U.S. general public were
provided the following brief description of a well-known U.S.-based company Google [Exxon
Mobil]. Please predict how YOU believe 100 people from the general public will respond to the
two statements below. Specifically, identify the number of people (out of 100) that you believe
would provide each of the possible responses (i.e., Strongly Agree, Agree, Somewhat agree,
Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly Agree). Participants
evaluated the following statements: “Google [Exxon Mobil] has a positive reputation” and
“Google [Exxon Mobil] is a good corporate citizen.”18 Tax professionals also answered a series
of demographic and check questions.

18

To maximize the number of professionals who were willing to participate, I kept the survey length shorter by
asking tax professionals to predict responses to only two of the Experiment 1 reputation questions.
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Experiment 2 Results
Hypothesis 6 predicts that tax professionals will accurately anticipate the public’s
reaction to media reports that a company engaged in aggressive tax avoidance strategies. For
both dependent variables, I summarize each professional’s mean predicted reputation score by
calculating a weighted average score based on their percentage predictions. Recall that the
original reputation response scales were 7-point Likert scales with endpoints labeled Strongly
Disagree (1) and Strongly Agree (7). Thus, if a tax professional predicted that 25% of
participants would choose ‘2,’ 25% would choose ‘3,’ 25% would choose ‘4’ and 25% would
choose ‘5,’ that tax professional’s average reputation prediction score would equal 3.5. I
calculated an average predicted reputation score for each professional’s pre-test predictions and a
separate score using their post-test reputation predictions. I then computed the tax professional’s
predicted change in reputation as the difference between average post-test predicted reputation
and average pre-test predicted reputation.
I compare tax professionals’ predictions about reputational change with the actual
reputational change observed in Experiment 1. Specifically, I calculate a difference score by
subtracting each tax professional’s predicted reputation change score from the actual average
reputation change score from the related condition in Experiment 1 (see Table 3 for the public’s
actual change scores). When I conduct this analysis on the “Google [Exxon Mobil] has a
positive reputation” question, I find an overall mean difference score of 0.2. A positive
difference score implies that tax professionals tend to underestimate the public’s negative
reaction to news of aggressive tax avoidance. However, additional analysis shows that this
difference is not significantly different than zero (t = 1.06, two-tailed p = 0.30).
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When I do the same type of analyses on the “Google [Exxon Mobil] is a good corporate
citizen” measure, I once again find that the overall mean difference score after subtracting
professionals’ predictions from the actual reputation consequences is positive (µ = 0.3). This
mean difference score differs from zero (t = 2.34, two-tailed p < 0.05). This suggests that tax
professionals underestimate the reputational damage that companies will incur if the public
learns that the company engaged in aggressive tax avoidance strategies. As additional support
for this conclusion, 73% [27%] of tax professionals had positive [negative] difference scores for
this question, suggesting that tax professionals were much more likely to underestimate than to
overestimate the negative reputation effect of tax avoidance.19
To summarize, Experiment 2 provides preliminary evidence on tax professionals’ ability
to predict reputational damage from tax avoidance. My sample size is low, so these results
should be interpreted with caution. However, my data provide preliminary evidence suggesting
that tax professionals understand that reputational consequences of aggressive tax avoidance
exist, but tend to underestimate the consequences, at least for some measures, of corporate
reputation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
My study examines whether damage to reputation occurs when the public learns that
companies have engaged in aggressive tax avoidance strategies. I find that companies do
experience damage to their reputations when the public learns that they engaged in aggressive
tax avoidance. These results suggest that the public punishes companies for paying less than
their perceived fair share of the tax burden and shirking their obligation to society.

19

Note that due to the small sample sizes in individual cells, I am unable to make meaningful inferences about the
effects, if any, that Prior Reputation and Tax Strategy have on tax professionals’ ability to predict the reputational
consequences of tax avoidance. Thus, I do not report ANOVA results for Experiment 2.
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I also investigate whether the company’s prior reputation influences the public’s reaction
to tax avoidance news. I hypothesize that the public will react more negatively to tax avoidance
if the company has a negative prior reputation, but I observe the opposite. In my experiment, the
positive prior reputation company (Google) suffered greater reputational damage than the
negative prior reputation company (Exxon Mobil) for engaging in identical tax avoidance
strategies. Perhaps this result is due to the public holding “good” companies to a higher standard
of conduct. My study also examines how features of tax avoidance strategies influence
reputational consequences. I find that illegal strategies do not result in greater reputational
damage than legal strategies. However, legal strategies that do not follow the intent of the law
result in greater reputational damage than legal strategies that do follow the law’s intent.
I am not able to capture whether reputational damage caused by tax avoidance affect
actual investment, employment and purchase decisions. However, I ask my experimental
participants about their behavioral intentions. Participants indicate that if a company engages in
aggressive tax avoidance, they are less likely to invest in the company’s stock, less interested in
being employed by the company, and less willing to purchase the company’s products. These
results suggest that reputational damage caused by tax avoidance strategies may lead to more
serious long-term effects.
Finally, my study provides preliminary small-sample evidence on whether experienced
tax professionals accurately anticipate the public’s reaction to news of aggressive tax avoidance
strategies. I find that tax professionals are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the
reputational damage caused by such strategies. My study demonstrates that corporate tax
executives have reason, at least in the short-term, to be concerned about reputational
consequences of tax avoidance. Thus, these results should be informative to tax executives and

SMART OR SHIRKING

35

their advisors as they weigh the benefits, costs, and risks of various tax strategies. I also provide
preliminary evidence that tax professionals tend to underestimate potential reputational damage.
Knowledge of this general tendency toward underestimation may allow tax professionals to
make adjustments and provide more accurate advice to their clients.
My study has several limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, my study
captures the public’s immediate reactions to news of aggressive tax avoidance. Gallemore et al.,
(2014) find that negative market reactions, a proxy the authors use for reputation, reverse within
30 days of news of aggressive avoidance. By capturing the public’s immediate reaction, my
study was unable to determine if damage experienced is indeed permanent. Future studies can
examine the extent to which this damage endures. Second, my study examines a tax avoidance
strategy that results in enormous tax savings ($2 billion). Future studies can examine whether
and how the size of the avoidance affects reputational damage.
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TABLE 1
EXPERIMENT 1 – PRE-TEST PERCEIVED REPUTATION

PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PRE-TEST PERCEIVED REPUTATION
Negative Prior Reputation

Positive Prior Reputation

(Exxon Mobil)

(Google)

µ = 4.3

µ = 5.6

SD = 1.7

SD = 1.1

N = 145

N = 149

PANEL B: ANOVA RESULTS FOR PRE-TEST PERCEIVED REPUTATION
Source

df

MSE

F-stat

p-value

Prior Reputation

1

130.68

66.20

<0.01

292

1.97

Residual

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and ANOVA results (Panel B) for pre-test Perceived Reputation. Participants were randomly assigned to evaluate
either Exxon Mobil or Google. Participants answered five Perceived Reputation questions before viewing a news article about the company. Specifically,
participants indicated whether Google [Exxon Mobil] (1) was company that they could trust, (2) was a company they admired and respected, (3) whether they had
good feelings about the company, (4) whether the company had a positive reputation, and (5) whether the company was a good corporate citizen. Participants
provided responses on 7-point Likert scales, where higher responses indicated greater perceived reputation. The Cronbach’s alpha for these five pre-test items is
above the 0.70 threshold, suggesting that they capture one underlying construct (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Therefore, I average each participant’s responses to
the five questions to form a composite Perceived Reputation measure.
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TABLE 2
EXPERIMENT 1 – PRE-TEST INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCT USE INTENTIONS
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PRE-TEST INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCT USE INTENTIONS
Negative Prior Reputation (Exxon Mobil)

Disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
Agree

10.3%

9.0%

24.8%

n=27

n=15

n=13

17.9%

11.0%

n=26

Somewhat

Investment

Employment

Product Use

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

18.6%

Positive Prior Reputation (Google)

Disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

8.1%

4.0%

29.5%

20.1%

19.5%

17.4%

n=2

n=12

n=6

n=44

n=30

n=29

n=26

11.7%

4.0%

6.0%

4.7%

24.8%

17.4%

23.5%

19.5%

n=16

n=17

n=6

n=9

n=7

n=37

n=26

n=35

n=29

23.4%

30.3%

15.9%

1.3%

0.0%

0.7%

6.7%

16.1%

34.2%

40.9%

n=34

n=44

n=23

n=2

n=0

n=1

n=10

n=24

n=51

n=61

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

13.8%

11.7%

11.7%

1.3%

n=36

n=20

n=17

n=17

11.0%

26.9%

10.3%

11.0%

n=16

n=16

n=39

n=15

9.0%

2.8%

6.2%

12.4%

n=13

n=4

n=9

n=18

PANEL B: ANOVA RESULTS
PRE-TEST INVESTMENT INTENTIONS
Source
Prior Reputation
Residual

df
1

MSE
74.00

292

3.06

df
1

MSE
94.28

292

3.20

df
1

MSE
88.24

292

2.11

F-stat
24.20

p-value
< 0.01

F-stat
29.51

p-value
< 0.01

F-stat
41.75

p-value
< 0.01

PRE-TEST EMPLOYMENT INTENTIONS
Source
Prior Reputation
Residual
PRE-TEST PRODUCT USE INTENTIONS
Source
Prior Reputation
Residual
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TABLE 2
EXPERIMENT 1 – PRE-TEST INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCT USE INTENTIONS continued
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and ANOVA results (Panel B) for participants’ pre-test investment, employment, and product use intentions.
Participants were randomly assigned to evaluate either Exxon Mobil or Google and indicated their agreement with the following statements on 7-point Likert
scales: I am willing to invest in Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] stock, I would like to be employed by Google [Exxon Mobil], and I am willing to use Google’s [Exxon
Mobil’s] products.
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TABLE 3
EXPERIMENT 1 – PERCEIVED REPUTATION DIFFERENCE SCORES

PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERCEIVED REPUTATION DIFFERENCE SCORES
Negative Prior
Reputation
(Exxon Mobil)
µ = -1.0
SD = 1.6
N = 59

Positive Prior
Reputation
(Google)
µ = -0.9
SD = 1.7
N = 58

TOTAL
µ = -1.0
SD = 1.7
N = 117

Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -1.3
SD = 0.9
N = 43

µ = -1.5
SD = 1.3
N = 39

µ = -1.4
SD = 1.1
N = 82

Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.5
N = 43

µ = -2.0
SD = 1.7
N = 52

µ = -1.6
SD = 1.7
N = 95

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.4
N = 145

µ = -1.4
SD = 1.7
N = 149

µ = -1.3
SD = 1.6
N = 294

Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent

TOTAL

PANEL B: ANOVA RESULTS FOR PERCEIVED REPUTATION DIFFERENCE SCORES
Source

df

MSE

F-stat

p-value

Prior Reputation

1

8.08

3.48

0.06

Tax Strategy

2

9.88

4.25

0.02

Prior Reputation x Tax Strategy

2

6.06

2.61

0.08

288

2.32

Residual
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TABLE 3
EXPERIMENT 1 – PERCEIVED REPUTATION DIFFERENCE SCORES continued

Table 3 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and ANOVA results (Panel B) for the Perceived Reputation difference scores. Participants answered five Perceived
Reputation questions twice – before and after viewing a news article about a company that employed a tax avoidance strategy. The five questions asked participants
to indicate whether Google [Exxon Mobil] (1) was company that they could trust, (2) was a company they admired and respected, (3) whether they had good
feelings about the company, (4) whether the company had a positive reputation, and (5) whether the company was a good corporate citizen. Participants provided
responses on 7-point Likert scales, where higher responses indicated greater perceived reputation. The Cronbach’s alpha for the five pre-test items and the five
post-test items are both above the 0.70 threshold, suggesting that each measure captures one underlying construct (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Therefore, I
averaged each participant’s pre-test responses to the five questions to form a composite pre-test Perceived Reputation measure and averaged each participant’s posttest responses to form a composite post-test measure. I then calculated a Perceived Reputation difference score for each participant by subtracting pre-test Perceived
Reputation from post-test Perceived Reputation. Positive [negative] difference scores suggest that the tax avoidance news article had a positive [negative] effect on
the company’s reputation.
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TABLE 4
EXPERIMENT 1 – DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR INVESTMENT INTENTIONS

PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Negative Prior
Reputation
(Exxon Mobil)
µ = -0.5
SD = 1.7
N = 59

Positive Prior
Reputation
(Google)
µ = -0.7
SD = 1.6
N = 58

TOTAL
µ = -0.6
SD = 1.7
N = 117

Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -1.0
SD = 1.5
N = 43

µ = -0.9
SD = 1.7
N = 39

µ = -0.9
SD = 1.6
N = 82

Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -0.8
SD = 1.5
N = 43

µ = -1.5
SD = 1.9
N = 52

µ = -1.2
SD = 1.8
N = 95

µ = -0.7
SD = 1.6
N = 145

µ = -1.0
SD = 1.8
N = 149

µ = -0.9
SD = 1.8
N = 294

Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent

TOTAL

PANEL B: ANOVA RESULTS
Source

df

MSE

F-state

p-value

Prior Reputation

1

5.20

1.87

0.17

Tax Strategy

2

8.09

2.90

0.06

Prior Reputation x Tax Strategy

2

4.35

1.56

0.21

288

2.79

Residual

Table 4 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and ANOVA results (Panel B) for Investment difference scores. Participants were randomly assigned to evaluate
either Google or Exxon Mobil and indicated their agreement with the following statement on a 7-point Likert scale: I am willing to invest in Google’s [Exxon
Mobil’s] stock. Participants answered this question twice – before and after viewing a news article about Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] use of a tax avoidance strategy.
I calculated an Investment difference score for each participant by subtracting pre-test Investment intentions from post-test Investment intentions. Positive [negative]
difference scores suggest that the tax avoidance news article had a positive [negative] effect on participants’ willingness to invest in the company’s stock.
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TABLE 5
EXPERIMENT 1 – DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR EMPLOYMENT INTENTIONS

PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Negative Prior
Reputation
(Exxon Mobil)
µ = -0.8
SD = 1.7
N = 59

Positive Prior
Reputation
(Google)
µ = -0.7
SD = 1.7
N = 58

TOTAL
µ = -0.7
SD = 1.7
N = 117

Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -0.6
SD = 1.2
N = 43

µ = -0.8
SD = 1.5
N = 39

µ = -0.7
SD = 1.4
N = 82

Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -0.6
SD = 1.6
N = 43

µ = -1.4
SD = 1.8
N = 52

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.8
N = 95

µ = -0.7
SD = 1.6
N = 145

µ = -1.0
SD = 1.8
N = 149

µ = -0.8
SD = 1.6
N = 294

Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent

TOTAL

PANEL B: ANOVA RESULTS
Source

df

MSE

F-state

p-value

Prior Reputation

1

6.78

2.63

0.11

Tax Strategy

2

3.37

1.31

0.27

Prior Reputation x Tax Strategy

2

5.60

2.17

0.12

288

2.58

Residual

Table 5 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and ANOVA results (Panel B) for Employment difference scores. Participants were randomly assigned to evaluate
either Google or Exxon Mobil and indicated their agreement with the following statement on a 7-point Likert scale: I would like to be employed by Google [Exxon
Mobil]. Participants answered this question twice – before and after viewing a news article about Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] use of a tax avoidance strategy. I
calculated an Employment difference score for each participant by subtracting their pre-test Employment rating from their post-test Employment rating. Positive
[negative] difference scores suggest that the tax avoidance news article had a positive [negative] effect on participants’ interest in being employed by the
company.
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TABLE 6
EXPERIMENT 1 – DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR PRODUCT USE INTENTIONS

PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Legal/Consistent with Law’s Intent

Negative Prior Reputation
(Exxon Mobil)
µ = -1.0
SD = 1.9
N = 59

Positive Prior Reputation
(Google)
µ = -0.7
SD = 1.8
N = 58

TOTAL
µ = -0.9
SD = 1.8
N = 117

Legal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.4
N = 43

µ = -0.9
SD = 1.3
N = 39

µ = -1.0
SD = 1.4
N = 82

Illegal/Inconsistent with Law’s Intent

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.8
N = 43

µ = -1.6
SD = 1.8
N = 52

µ = -1.3
SD = 1.8
N = 95

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.7
N = 145

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.7
N = 149

µ = -1.1
SD = 1.7
N = 294

TOTAL

PANEL B: ANOVA RESULTS
Source
Prior Reputation

df
1

MSE
.06

F-stat
.021

p-value
.89

Tax Strategy

2

5.42

1.86

.16

Prior Reputation x Tax Strategy

2

5.10

1.75

.18

288

2.92

Residual

Table 6 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and ANOVA results (Panel B) for Product Use difference scores. Participants were randomly assigned to evaluate
either Google or Exxon Mobil and indicated their agreement with the following statement on a 7-point Likert scale: I am willing to use Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s]
products. Participants answered this question twice – before and after viewing a news article about Google’s [Exxon Mobil’s] use of a tax avoidance strategy. I
calculated a Product Use difference score for each participant by subtracting their pre-test Product Use rating from their post-test Product Use rating. Positive
[negative] difference scores suggest that the tax avoidance news article had a positive [negative] effect on participants’ interest in using the company’s products.
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APPENDIX A
PRE-TEST SURVEY MATERIAL
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Screen #1
There is a popular debate surrounding corporate responsibility. Some people believe that a
corporation’s responsibility is to be as profitable as possible while following the law. Others
believe that corporations have the additional responsibility to do what is ethical and fair, be a
good corporate citizen, and/or contribute resources to their communities.
Below is a list of ten well-known U.S. companies. For each company, respond with your
agreement to the following statement:
•

I believe Amazon.com is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe Apple Inc. is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe Comcast Corporation is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe Exxon Mobil is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe Google is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
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I believe Johnson & Johnson is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe PhillipMorris USA (an Altria Company) is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe The Walt Disney Company is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe United Airlines is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company
•

I believe Wells Fargo & Company is a good corporate citizen.

|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strongly
Strongly Not familiar
Disagree
Agree with company

SMART OR SHIRKING

53

Screen #2
From the companies listed, drag and drop the one company you believe is the BEST corporate
citizen and the company you believe is the WORST corporate citizen.
BEST corporate citizen

Amazon.com
Apple Inc.
Comcast Corporation
Exxon Mobil Corporation
Google
Johnson & Johnson
PhillipMorris USA (an Altria Company)
The Walt Disney Company
United Airlines
Wells Fargo & Company

WORST corporate citizen

Screen #3
Answer the following demographic questions.
•

What is your gender?

•

What is your age? ____________________

•

What is your marital status? Married

•

What is your profession? __________________

•

How would you classify your political beliefs?
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Extremely
Extremely
Liberal
Conservative

•

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Female

____ High school graduate
____ 2-year college graduate
____ 4-year college graduate
____ Master's or other professional graduate
____ Other (specify ________________)

Male

Single
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENT #1 MATERIAL
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SCREEN 1 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a brief description of a well-known U.S. company – Google Inc. – and
answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Google.
Google Inc. is an American multinational technology company that specializes in Internet-related services and
products, including online advertising technologies, search, cloud computing, software, and hardware.
Google’s mission statement is “to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and
useful.”
• Google is a company that I trust.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
•

Google is a company that I admire and respect.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I have good feelings about Google.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Google has a positive reputation.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Google is a good corporate citizen.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to use Google’s products.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to invest in Google’s stock.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I would like to be employed by Google.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
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SCREEN 1 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a brief description of a well-known U.S. company – ExxonMobil Inc. – and
answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about ExxonMobil.
Exxon Mobil Inc. is an American multinational energy company that is involved in virtually every segment of
the energy sector from coal mining and electricity to the production, exploration and marketing of oil and gas.
ExxonMobil’s mission statement is “to be the world's premier petroleum and petrochemical company.”
•

Exxon Mobil is a company that I trust.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil is a company that I admire and respect.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I have good feelings about Exxon Mobil.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil has a positive reputation.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil is a good corporate citizen.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to use Exxon Mobil’s products.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to invest in Exxon Mobil’s stock.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I would like to be employed by Exxon Mobil.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
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SCREEN 2 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a recent newspaper article about Google. Once you’ve read the article,
please click on the Next Screen button at the bottom of the page. On the following screen, you will once again
answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Google.
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SCREEN 2 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/NOT INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a recent newspaper article about Google. Once you’ve read the article,
please click on the Next Screen button at the bottom of the page. On the following screen, you will once again
answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Google.
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SCREEN 2 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & ILLEGAL/NOT INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a recent newspaper article about Google. Once you’ve read the article,
please click on the Next Screen button at the bottom of the page. On the following screen, you will once again
answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Google.
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SCREEN 2 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a recent newspaper article about Exxon Mobil. Once you’ve read the
article, please click on the Next Screen button at the bottom of the page. On the following screen, you will once
again answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Exxon Mobil.
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SCREEN 2 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/NOT INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a recent newspaper article about Exxon Mobil. Once you’ve read the
article, please click on the Next Screen button at the bottom of the page. On the following screen, you will once
again answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Exxon Mobil.

SMART OR SHIRKING

62

SCREEN 2 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & ILLEGAL/NOT INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: Below you will read a recent newspaper article about Exxon Mobil. Once you’ve read the
article, please click on the Next Screen button at the bottom of the page. On the following screen, you will once
again answer a series of questions regarding your feelings about Exxon Mobil.
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SCREEN 3 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITION)
Instructions: Now that you have read the newspaper article, indicate your agreement with the following
statements regarding your current feelings of the company Google.
•

Google is a company that I trust.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Google is a company that I admire and respect.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I have good feelings about Google.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Google has a positive reputation.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Google is a good corporate citizen.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to use Google’s products.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to invest in Google’s stock.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I would like to be employed by Google.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
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SCREEN 3 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITION)
Instructions: Now that you have read the newspaper article, indicate your agreement with the following
statements regarding your current feelings of the company Exxon Mobil.
•

Exxon Mobil is a company that I trust.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil is a company that I admire and respect.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I have good feelings about Exxon Mobil.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil has a positive reputation.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil is a good corporate citizen.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to use Exxon Mobil’s products.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I am willing to invest in Exxon Mobil’s stock.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

I would like to be employed by Exxon Mobil.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
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SCREEN 4 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Continue with the following statements.
•

My perception of Google’s corporate citizenship changed after reading the newspaper article about the
company’s tax avoidance strategy.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

It is acceptable for Google to maximize profits by using the complex tax avoidance strategy reported in
the article.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Google has the responsibility to use all available tax avoidance strategies to increase corporate profits.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

When Google uses tax avoidance strategies, the company is neglecting its responsibility to contribute to
society.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

Instructions: Complete the following statements regarding Google’s tax strategy reported in the article.
• According to the tax expert’s opinion, Google’s tax strategy was:
_____ technically consistent with U.S. tax laws (technically legal).
_____ technically inconsistent with U.S. tax laws (technically illegal).
•

According to the tax expert, Google’s tax strategy was:
_____ consistent with the tax law’s intent (‘spirit’ of the law).
_____ inconsistent with the tax law’s intent (not the ‘spirit’ of the law).

•

When Google’s management is faced with a decision about its tax strategies, two competing
responsibilities must be considered - their responsibility to minimize taxes and maximize profits and
their responsibility to be a good corporate citizen by paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes. Google’s primary
responsibility should be?
_____ Minimize tax (maximize profits)
_____ Good corporate citizenship (paying their ‘fair share’)
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SCREEN 4 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Continue with the following statements.
•

My perception of Exxon Mobil’s corporate citizenship changed after reading the newspaper article about
the company’s tax avoidance strategy.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

It is acceptable for Exxon Mobil to maximize profits by using the complex tax avoidance strategy
reported in the article.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

Exxon Mobil has the responsibility to use all available tax avoidance strategies to increase corporate
profits.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

•

When Exxon Mobil uses tax avoidance strategies, the company is neglecting its responsibility to
contribute to society.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

Instructions: Complete the following statements regarding Exxon Mobil’s tax strategy reported in the
article.
• According to the tax expert’s opinion, Exxon Mobil’s tax strategy was:
_____ technically consistent with U.S. tax laws (technically legal).
_____ technically inconsistent with U.S. tax laws (technically illegal).
•

According to the tax expert, Exxon Mobil’s tax strategy was:
_____ consistent with the tax law’s intent (‘spirit’ of the law).
_____ inconsistent with the tax law’s intent (not the ‘spirit’ of the law).

•

When Exxon Mobil’s management is faced with a decision about its tax strategies, two competing
responsibilities must be considered - their responsibility to minimize taxes and maximize profits and
their responsibility to be a good corporate citizen by paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes. Exxon Mobil’s
primary responsibility should be?
_____ Minimize tax (maximize profits)
_____ Good corporate citizenship (paying their ‘fair share’)
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SCREEN 5 (ALL CONDITIONS)

•

What is your gender?

•

What is your age? ____________________

•

What is your marital status? Married

•

What is your profession? __________________

•

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Female

Male

Single

____ High school graduate
____ 2-year college graduate
____ 4-year college graduate
____ Master’s or other professional graduate
____ Other (specify ________________)
•

Indicate your agreement with the following statement
My political beliefs are
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
1

Extremely
Liberal

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
Conservative
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENT #2 MATERIAL
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SCREEN 1 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Assume that a sample of 100 people from the general public in the U.S. were provided the
following brief description of a well-known U.S.-based company – Google Corporation.
Google Corporation is a U.S.-based international energy company that is involved
in virtually every segment of the energy sector from the production, exploration
and marketing of oil and gas. According to Google, its mission is “to be the
world's premier petroleum and petrochemical company”.
Instructions: Please predict how YOU believe 100 people from the general public will respond
to the two statements below. Specifically, identify the number of people (out of 100) that you
believe would provide each of the possible responses (i.e., Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat
agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree).
Note that your answers must sum to 100 for each statement.
•

•

Google has a positive reputation
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%

Google is a good corporate citizen
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%
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SCREEN 1 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Assume that a sample of 100 people from the general public in the U.S. were provided the
following brief description of a well-known U.S.-based company – Exxon Mobil Corporation.
Exxon Mobil Corporation is a U.S.-based international energy company that is
involved in virtually every segment of the energy sector from the production,
exploration and marketing of oil and gas. According to Exxon Mobil, its mission
is “to be the world's premier petroleum and petrochemical company”.
Instructions: Please predict how YOU believe 100 people from the general public will respond
to the two statements below. Specifically, identify the number of people (out of 100) that you
believe would provide each of the possible responses (i.e., Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat
agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree).
Note that your answers must sum to 100 for each statement.
•

•

Exxon Mobil has a positive reputation
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%

Exxon Mobil is a good corporate citizen
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%
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SCREEN 2 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: On the next page you will read a newspaper article recently published about
Google. Once you have carefully read the entire article, click the arrow button at the end and
you will be asked to respond to another series of statements regarding YOUR prediction of how
the general public will respond.
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SCREEN 2 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/NOT INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: On the next page you will read a newspaper article recently published about
Google. Once you have carefully read the entire article, click the arrow button at the end and
you will be asked to respond to another series of statements regarding YOUR prediction of how
the general public will respond.
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SCREEN 2 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: On the next page you will read a newspaper article recently published about
Exxon Mobil. Once you have carefully read the entire article, click the arrow button at the end
and you will be asked to respond to another series of statements regarding YOUR prediction of

how the general public will respond.
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SCREEN 2 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION & LEGAL/NOT INTENT CONDITION)
Instructions: On the next page you will read a newspaper article recently published about
Exxon Mobil. Once you have carefully read the entire article, click the arrow button at the end
and you will be asked to respond to another series of statements regarding YOUR prediction of
how the general public will respond.
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SCREEN 3 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Instructions: Predict how YOU believe 100 people from the general public will respond to the
same statements AFTER reading the newspaper articles. Similar to the pre-test, identify the
number of people (out of 100) that you believe would provide each of the possible responses (i.e.,
Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree,
Disagree, Strongly disagree).
Note that your answers must sum to 100 for each statement.
•

•

Google has a positive reputation
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%

Google is a good corporate citizen
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%
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SCREEN 3 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Instructions: Predict how YOU believe 100 people from the general public will respond to the
same statements AFTER reading the newspaper articles. Similar to the pre-test, identify the
number of people (out of 100) that you believe would provide each of the possible responses (i.e.,
Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree,
Disagree, Strongly disagree).
Note that your answers must sum to 100 for each statement.
•

•

Exxon Mobil has a positive reputation
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%

Exxon Mobil is a good corporate citizen
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

Total

_____%
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SCREEN 4 (POSITIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Instructions: Complete the following statements regarding Google's tax strategy reported in the
article.
•

The tax expert quoted in the article stated that Google’s tax strategy was:
_____ technically consistent with U.S. tax laws (i.e., technically legal)
_____ technically inconsistent with U.S. tax laws (i.e., technically illegal)

•

The tax expert quoted in the article stated that Google’s tax strategy was:
_____ consistent with the tax law’s intent (‘spirit’ of the law).
_____ inconsistent with the tax law’s intent (not the ‘spirit’ of the law).

SCREEN 4 (NEGATIVE PRIOR REPUTATION CONDITIONS)
Instructions: Complete the following statements regarding Exxon Mobil's tax strategy reported
in the article.
•

The tax expert quoted in the article stated that Exxon Mobil’s tax strategy was:
_____ technically consistent with U.S. tax laws (i.e., technically legal)
_____ technically inconsistent with U.S. tax laws (i.e., technically illegal)

•

The tax expert quoted in the article stated that Exxon Mobil’s tax strategy was:
_____ consistent with the tax law’s intent (‘spirit’ of the law).
_____ inconsistent with the tax law’s intent (not the ‘spirit’ of the law).
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SCREEN 5 (ALL CONDITIONS)

Instructions: Please answer the following background information regarding your professional
experience.
•

My current rank within my firm is:
____ Partner
____ Manager
____ Senior
____ Other (Please specify _______________)

•

I have worked at this level (i.e., manager, partner) for _______ years.

•

I have worked as a public tax practitioner for _______ years.

•

In terms of size, the firm I work for is best classified as:
____ Big 4 firm
____ Non Big 4 firm with national client base
____ Non Big 4 firm with regional client base
____ Other (Please specify _______________)

•

I have worked on the following types of tax engagements (check all that apply):
____ Sales and Use Tax return preparation
____ Sales and Use Tax reduction strategies
____ Income Tax return preparation
____ Income Tax reduction strategies
____ Other (Please specify _______________)
____ Other (Please specify _______________)

•

I have worked on the following types of tax clients (check all that apply):
____ Non-Profits
____ Individuals
____ Flow-through entities
____ C Corporations
____ Other (Please specify _______________)

•

Regarding ownership, the businesses I have worked on have been primarily:
____ Publicly owned
____ Privately owned

